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Disciplines
Spatial justice as a concept seems to be at home in many disciplines, such as 
geography, sociology, law, politics, philosophy and so on. Precisely because of this, 
its nature, definition, context and repercussions are yet to be worked out to a 
satisfactory degree. The contributions in this volume help advance the discussion, 
adding context and expanding the modes of defining and experiencing spatial 
justice. It is remarkable, for example, that spatial justice can inform contexts as 
varied as the gulf states, british self-defence manuals for women, water religious 
rituals, post-war housing reclamations, Instagram tags, waste transport and art 
practices – and likewise be informed by these new contexts. It attests to the richness 
but also potential vagueness of the concept.
What I am tasked to do here, in these brief concluding remarks, is to bring together 
some of the various strands of the concept and practice of spatial justice, both as 
they appear here and as they have informed my work so far, and move the concept 
in a direction that is both supradisciplinary and faithful to its legal and geographical 
origins; both theoretically-informed and immediately related to practice; and, finally, 
both as a quotidian occurrence and as a horizon of potential development. 
Nature
Even before offering a definition, it is important to consider the nature of spatial 
justice. Some questions that might help situate it might be: is it a concept or an 
actual practice? Is it something already happening or something on the horizon, for 
which we need to wait? Can we talk about spatial justice as a right, an inalienable 
condition of the human being, an obligation even in terms of how to achieve it and 
preserve it? And consequently, can we talk about methods of achieving it, preserving 
it or even articulating it?
Despite the occasional wishful thinking, the chapters of this collection point to the 
opposite direction. Spatial justice is neither inalienable, nor easily achievable. Part of 
the difficulty (and the openness to new, fascinating challenges) is that it can no 
longer be thought of as just human. If it is a concept, no definition can be agreed 
upon. If it is a practice, its terrain might seem overly broad. A method of achieving it 
is not easily prescribed, its precise condition not articulable, its duration, consistency 
or eventual outcome not clearly sketched. Spatial justice seems to be dwelling in a 
grey area between impression, occasionally nebulous conceptual thinking, and an 
understanding that everyone kind of knows what spatial justice and for this reason a 
definitional engagement might not be worth pursuing. 
The chapters of this collection converge, however, on some points. Perhaps the 
most important one is that spatial justice is an emergence. It arises from 
combinations of objects and bodies, human and nonhuman, spreading across 
embodied and material instances of space, but also across digital and ideological 
instances of space. Let us call these combinations, following Deleuze and Guattari, 
assemblages. Assemblages are the ground of spatial justice. They are the conditions 
of its possibility but also of its fragility: spatial justice emerges on an everyday basis, 
in an unfussed, unplanned even way, right next to us - but never to-order. Its 
emergence remains unpredictable. Likewise, if achieved, the whole situation is at 
risk of readily freezing and turning into something that feels much more unjust than 
just, an atmosphere of oppressive co-optation that from the inside feels comfortable 
and even rightful but is ontologically suspect. Spatial justice is a capricious thing, and 
one needs to be very careful in case it becomes yet another tool of co-optation or 
continuation of the status quo. It is our responsibility to sharpen the concept and its 
application, and set the steps for its achievement, to the extent possible.
Definition
There is a paucity of definitional attempts on spatial justice. The majority of the 
literature on spatial justice relies on the given approaches by Ed Soja and David 
Harvey.1 These approaches, however important, rely on an anthropocentric, space-
as-container, law-as-politics, justice-as-distribution or locality understanding of 
spatial justice.2 It is clear that a different, more nuanced definition would have to 
convey the complexity and particularity of spatial justice in the epoch of the 
Anthropocene, by taking into consideration the posthuman, mediated nature of an 
assemblage as the ground of spatial justice; the fact that spatial justice is an 
emergence and not a prescribed action; that it is intimately connected with issues of 
excess and affect; and that it needs to be constantly revised and reconsidered rather 
than taken as a final destination.
Spatial justice is (or is also) a legal concept, to the extent that justice is administered 
by law and that legal resolutions of conflicts are often felt more like justice than any 
other resolution. But justice frequently comes down to an affective response, as most 
contributions amply show: just like its possibility of emergence, its reception is also 
excessive and not given to measurement.
For the above reasons, at different points in my work I have offered variations on the 
definition of spatial justice – partly to capture the performative aspect of the notion 
but also to reflect the waves of interdisciplinary cross-fertilisation that have been 
taking place in the past few years across law, geography, sociology and philosophy, 
in line with such developments as the corporeal turn, the spatial turn, the affective 
turn, the material turn and so on. The definition that seems more prominently used in 
this book is the agonistic take on space and corporeality I have attempted in my 
1 Edward Soja, Seeking Spatial Justice, Mineapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010; 
David Harvey, Social Justice and the City, Oxford: Blackwell, 1973
2 For my critical take on these, see A. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Spatial Justice: Body 
Lawscape Atmosphere, London: Routledge, 2015
2015 book Spatial Justice. To put it simply, spatial justice is the question that arises 
when a body desires to move into the space of another body. 
It is important that spatial justice remains a question. If it were an answer, namely an 
affirmative definition that would construct and suggest a specific situation, it would be 
tantamount to a situation of perfect emplacement of the various bodies along each 
other. It would be an ideal that would hark back to theological constructions of 
harmony and peace. It would finally capture time in eternity. It would, in short, be a 
utopia of unconvincing value, that would need to exclude conflict and for this reason 
also difference, and freeze time artificially thereby halting evolution or even mere 
change. But if it remains a question that keeps on being asked in search of an 
answer, every given answer would be precarious yet always bound to its context, 
short-lived yet also fluid, steeped in interrogation rather than safe in its affirmation. 
This might indeed be the only way in which spatial justice should be thought of. 
However convincing or necessary an answer to a spatial justice problem might 
appear, it must always be mediated by the changing conditions of the assemblage in 
order to avoid coagulating it into fixed positions.
This essentially means that spatial justice keeps on questioning the positionings that 
the various bodies take, and pushes them along new positions, constant 
readjustments, renewed considerations of other bodies. In short, spatial justice is 
movement.
Allow me now to look closer into the three elements of the definition of spatial justice 
I offered above, namely body, space and movement. 
Body
A body is always collective. A body is always an assemblage. A body never moves 
as one, but always as a multiplicity. Francis Dodworth’s chapter on the 
representation of women’s self-defence in the past few decades, is the perfect 
example of how these assemblages emerge. When Dodworth writes that there has 
been a passage, from the 80s recommendation of jujitsu as self-defence to the later 
one about prevention of street crime against women, she presents us with a moving 
assemblage that keeps on incorporating different aspects of its environment. The 
assemblage here is not just the female bodies and the city, or the predatory male 
gaze. It is also the manuals that were urging different things according to the 
changing times and that “encouraged the reader to enfold particular forms of 
authority into the self”. It is also society at large that was changing from a culture of 
fear to one of emancipation. The preventative development of the self-defence 
philosophy aimed at changing the wider society by encouraging women to be 
reading their environment, inserting their bodies in it and working it, rather than 
fearing it and positioning themselves at a defensive distance to it: an ever closer, 
ever moving assemblage of human and nonhuman bodies and objects. The 
assemblage is not just radiating outside but importantly, encloses its inside folds: in 
this case, it extends inside the individual human body, with clusters of bacteria and 
knots of neurons, always connected to the outside yet also maintaining their 
independence. Dodworth shows how the assemblage changes from within when 
women were encouraged to manage the exterior manifestations of fear in the case of 
an assault: breathing to slow down the heart and prevent muscle spasms, or fist 
clenching and unclenching to keep the blood flowing and reduce trembling. Skin 
connects rather than separates. We are all part of an assemblage, our humanity 
mediated by other bodies, human and nonhuman, technological and ‘natural’, 
material and immaterial.
Is there a difference between bodies and objects? Although theory often uses either 
as inclusive of the other,3 and intents on clustering both human and nonhuman 
under the same rubric, I think it is important to acknowledge the often unconscious 
way these two seem to be differentiated. A body is often thought of as the animate 
version of a cluster of intensive (immaterial) and extensive (spatial and material) 
qualities. An object usually refers to the inanimate version of the same. Life breathes 
in and out of a body, but an object lies lifeless around until at best given life by a 
body. But what is the ‘dirt’ that is attached on the skin of the bodies observed by 
Sophie Watson in her aqueous chapter, all diligently queueing up in in the various 
sites of religious purification? Is dirt a body or an object? Is it animate or inanimate?
It is necessary to go beyond this distinction. It is important to conceptualise life as a 
force of connection but also withdrawal.4 If one could depart slightly from the classic 
vitalist understandings, one would perhaps see that life is not just about connection 
(through breath, movement, skin) but also about disconnection, withdrawal from 
ontological transfer of meaning, withdrawal from access by and even to one’s own 
self. The simultaneity of these two states, being connected and being withdrawn, is 
what can be thought of as life, anima, élan vital. Having life coursing through a body 
and indeed through an assemblage as a whole means that, under certain conditions, 
‘objects’ become lively, carry agency and determine movement, just as traditional 
bodies. In Olga Sezneva’s partly autoethnographic chapter on displacement and 
property repossession in postwar areas, her grandfather’s clock becomes an object 
full of life, luminously appearing in its tactile surfaces, deliriously withdrawing from 
her when it came to the way it was brought over all the way from Germany. Likewise, 
in many chapters, objects appear as elemental and as extensive as any animate 
body: oil and its petropolitics, or air and its conditioning (Molotch and Ponzini), waste 
and its supposed movement away that, however, always returns to haunt the globe 
(Califate-Faria), or water and its extensive yet often opaque symbolism (Watson).
Bodies are also immaterial, as several chapters in this collection show. Digital bodies 
such as the Instagram-tagged bodies that appear in David Herbert’s account of the 
trauma, or Gary Bridge’s non-discursive and performative as well as aesthetic 
experiences that produce communicative excess, are all part of the moving 
assemblages that vie for the same place at the same time in terms of spatial justice. 
3 Object-oriented Ontology and some strands of new materialism often use objects (e.g., Levi 
Bryant, The Democracy of Objects, Michigan: Open Humanities Press, 2011; Graham 
Harman, The Quadruple Object, Winchester: Zero Books, 2011), whereas more vitalist and 
Spinozan strands often use bodies (e.g., Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of 
Things, Durham: Duke University Press, 2010; Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman, Cambridge: 
Polity, 2013).
4 See extended argument in Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 'Lively Agency: Life and 
Law in the Anthropocene', in Irus Braverman (ed.), Animals, Biopolitics, Law: Lively 
Legalities, London: Routledge, 2016
Each assemblage emits affects that are part of its extension yet exceed even the 
movable, amoeba-like boundaries of the assemblage. This is the affective excess 
that cannot be controlled and that orders the space in and around the assemblage. 
Space
Although it would seem obvious that one would need to emphasise the spatial when 
talking about spatial justice, this is not always easy. Space is an obstreperous entity 
and often in the literature ends up being thought of as mere container or in its 
various representations as regional political processes, community belonging, even 
simple localities. But as we know from Doreen Massey,5 space is both much more 
and much less than that. It is both a process and a material movement. Space is not 
the stage on which things happen. We can go further: bodies are themselves space, 
carry space in and around them, affect space and are affected by space when they 
move and when they rest. Space is both smooth and striated,6 both an ontological 
continuum (what is there outside space?) and full of ruptures (identities, properties, 
borders, temporal zones, death).
The chapters in this volume take to space in earnest. In its turn, space obligingly 
blossoms in its multiplicity of folds and surfaces. One encounters here the perhaps 
less surprising yet engrossingly observed spaces of homes, both abandoned and 
claimed, in Olga Sezneva’s Kaliningrad; the contested spaces of post-apartheid 
South Africa as well as Roma France in Alison Rooke’s observation of art practices 
as a way of both visibilising and erasing the specificity of spaces; and the digital 
spaces in David Herbert’s account of how, eventually, physical and digital spaces 
converge in the way they both reinforce existing hierarchies of social preference and 
elevate the usual status-quo aesthetic preferences. 
Something of added interest to me emerges in Harvey Molotch and Davide Ponzini’s 
spaces of the Gulf states with their legal and illegal divisions across all layers of 
social and spatial organisation. In their chapter, they write how there are spaces of 
alegality, where the various laws are routinely ignored. They write “creating 
geographic zones of exception is so extensive in the Gulf that it becomes hard to 
think of laws and an administrative apparatus that is generally applicable to a given 
country or city, as opposed to specific districts (or a given check-out stand).” So, 
while the law is on the surface applied equally to all, in practice it is spatially and 
socially segregated. Is this however an alegal space, namely a space where there is 
no law? Or are these spaces where the law is otherwise, where state law applies 
less, and other kinds of laws, behavioural, social, postcolonial, oppressive, 
exploitative laws apply more? This is not just a theoretical point: if we accept that 
there are spaces without law, then we could even accept the greatest fallacy of law 
as an abstraction that applies universally. This is what I have tried to debunk with my 
theory of the lawscape, namely the tautology between law and space, and the 
5 Doreen Massey, For Space, London: Sage, 2005
6 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. B. Massumi, London: Athlone Press, 1988
impossibility of having one without the other. Lawscapes are grounds on which 
spatial justice routinely emerges, along or against the given law. It is important to 
understand that zones of exception are simply the confirmation of the lawscape – as 
we know after Agamben, only the sovereign can decide what is exempted. The 
exemption is the condition of possibility of the sovereign order – it is part of the 
lawscape, brimful with law.
Movement
All these bodies move with, through and against each other, generating lawscape 
(confirming existing and generating new spaces and new laws) with each movement. 
But the violence of space is that only one body (in its collectivity) can occupy the 
same space at the same time. Thus, the question of spatial justice emerges 
constantly when there is movement – do I have the right to be moving here, resting 
there, excluding this body from this space, inviting that body into my space? Did the 
residents of the new Kaliningrad have the ‘right’ to kick out the German residents 
from within their homes and occupy them anew? Does waste, in its movement from 
production to consumption (reuse, recycle, disposal) in Francisco Califate-Faria’s 
rollercoaster of political directionality of the most despised object of human 
existence, has priority over the rest of the planet? 
These perhaps are not the right questions. Bodies move, and in their movement, 
they sometimes merge with other bodies but more often than not, they just displace 
other bodies. Waste displaces the already marginalised bodies of the globe, whether 
human or nonhuman, but also fuses with the planet into a catastrophic 
anthropocenic assemblage where humans and their waste are stifling everything 
else. The Russians displaced the ones who lost the war yet fused with the houses 
they left behind. There is a need to recognise (yet also fight against) the fact that 
violence is an inherent element of the movement of spatial justice. The point is of 
course reparation and reconciliation, but the better point would be prevention: have 
these bodies ask themselves whether they should be moving in the direction they 
seem to be moving in the first place? Have waste producers (every single one of us 
individually, but also all of us as part of a collectivity) seriously asked whether we 
should be producing so much waste? 
And yet, perhaps the greatest movement of spatial justice is one of understanding. 
Olga Sezneva quotes from an interview of a new resident who took up possession of 
one of the german houses: “I was so happy, simply ecstatic. All I did was sit in my 
room looking out the window—my window! My room!” How can anyone judge this? 
How can anyone honestly, hand to heart, say that this is not a feeling one naturally 
identifies with? Part of the vicissitudes of property regimes no doubt, but also part of 
a deep desire to be living in a world where possessive pronouns can be freely used 
for at least some basic things like my home, my body, my life. These are ruptures in 
the continuum that are understandable, and we must be able to see them for what 
they are: dep ontological desires. Spatial justice, however, comes into this as a 
moderator of the desire to expand like a gas and take up all available space. Spatial 
justice questions the limits of our desires.
The greatest challenge, therefore, is to imagine a situation where different bodies co-
exist. In Sophie Watson’s chapter, co-presence of bodies and their movement is 
challenging when it comes to water rituals: “The chaplain at one university noted that 
Muslim colleagues are becoming better at articulating their needs to the institution, 
whereas previously they were ‘over-grateful’; but others see special provision the 
privileging one group over another. Many of the problems in non-Islamic countries 
arise from a lack of understanding of the practice since people in Islamic countries 
are more used to seeing water on the floor.” This  simplest of things, water spilled on 
a toilet floor (where Muslim colleagues perform their purification ritual) calls upon two 
different spheres of legal acceptance: health and safety versus religious observance. 
“Co-presence”, Watson carries on, “can thus be problematic.” But this would be a 
moment of spatial justice: a short answer to the spilled water. A nod of the head and 
a smile, sure it is hard, how not to spill, sinks are so small. And that’s it. For that 
quick moment, in the specific toilet, between those collective bodies of this and that, 
there will be a sprouting emergence of spatial justice. 
And after this, what? 
After this, the questioning continues. One needs to go back to the lawscape and 
question one’s position. Acceptance is enough as a start, and might lead 
somewhere, but needs concerted efforts on all sides to go further and deeper. The 
lawscape needs to be re-oriented. Conflict will not disappear – and luckily, nor will 
difference. But the discourse might change, and the emerging register might become 
less sharp, more accommodating. 
